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CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE IN COMMERCIAL LANDLORD
BANKRUPTCIES: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT MADE THE
RIGHT DECISION IN MATTER OF SPANISH PEAKS
HOLDINGS II, LLC
ABSTRACT
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Matter of Spanish Peaks Holdings II,
LLC exposes a major loophole in the Bankruptcy Code in the landlord-tenant
context. To exploit this loophole, real estate developers can establish two entities
and have them enter into a lease as landlord and tenant, with the lease’s terms
heavily favoring the tenant. Then, should the landlord have to file for bankruptcy
relief and liquidate its encumbered property, most lower courts will let the
tenant retain possession for the duration of the lease. In this way, the developer
will receive a financial windfall in the form of either a buyout or the opportunity
to continue running the tenant’s business on the purchaser’s land. This windfall
will come at the expense of the landlord’s creditors, since encumbered land sells
for less at auction. The majority approach therefore fails to balance the
Bankruptcy Code’s competing goals of maximizing creditor recovery and
protecting tenants.
To prevent such an abuse of the bankruptcy system, the Ninth Circuit
adopted a rule that requires tenants to request adequate protection prior to the
bankruptcy auction to receive continued possession or compensation. Because
the tenants in Spanish Peaks failed to make such a request, the Ninth Circuit
held that it was appropriate to terminate their leases without compensation. The
court left open the more difficult question of what it would have done had the
tenants requested adequate protection. This Comment explores that remaining
issue. It first argues that Spanish Peaks was a result-oriented opinion aimed at
depriving two tenant entities of continued possession or compensation. It next
proposes a way for judges to fashion adequate protection so as to minimize the
impact of an undeserving tenant’s recovery on the landlord-debtor’s legitimate
creditors. Since the Ninth Circuit’s holding allows judges to minimize tenant
recovery and thereby deter developers from exploiting the loophole in the
Bankruptcy Code, this Comment concludes that the minority approach of
fashioning adequate protection is more pragmatic than the majority approach
of always granting continued possession.
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INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Matter of Spanish Peaks Holdings II,
LLC (“Spanish Peaks”) has deepened an already great divide among the courts
regarding what to do with a commercial tenant’s leasehold interest when a
landlord sells its encumbered land at bankruptcy auction.1 Applying § 365 of
title 11 of the U.S. Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), most courts hold that any
tenants automatically get to remain in possession until the lease expires.2
Spanish Peaks departed from this majority approach because the sophisticated
landlords involved devised a savvy way to abuse it.3 Specifically, under the
majority approach, an individual can establish two entities and have both entities
enter into a lease as the landlord and tenant with terms that heavily favor the
tenant entity. Then, should the landlord entity’s business fail, forcing it to seek
bankruptcy relief and liquidate its property, courts will permit the tenant entity
to continue encumbering the land for the duration of the lease. The fact that the
land comes with a bad bargain will presumably lower its value at auction, raising
less money for the landlord’s creditors.4 Worse, to obtain full, unencumbered
fee simple in the land, the purchaser will have no choice but to buyout any
tenants. A tenant with a heavily one-sided, long-term lease could presumably
demand (and receive) a high price. The individual whose landlord entity had just
filed for bankruptcy relief would receive a huge windfall from such a buyout,
since it would allow that person to recoup losses at the expense of any creditors.
Therefore, there is a tremendous financial incentive for people to arrange real
estate developments in a way that allows some recovery in case of bankruptcy
liquidation.

1
Pinnacle Rest. at Big Sky, LLC v. CH SP Acquisitions, LLC (In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC),
872 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2017).
2
See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1996). See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (labelling this approach “the
‘majority’ approach”). Title 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) provides:

If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which the debtor is the lessor and—
if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights under such lease
(including rights such as those relating to the amount and timing of payment of rent and other
amounts payable by the lessee and any right of use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting,
assignment, or hypothecation) that are in or appurtenant to the real property for the balance of the
term of such lease and for any renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights
are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
3
4

In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
Id. at 898.
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To avoid landlord recovery under this scenario, the Ninth Circuit adopted an
approach that deprived commercial tenants of automatic continued possession.5
Courts that follow the Ninth Circuit’s “minority approach” to landlord
bankruptcies hold that, under 11 U.S.C. § 363, trustees can sell property free and
clear of a tenant entity’s lease, provided that on request of the tenant, the
bankruptcy judge grants it “adequate protection” for its interest.6 In Spanish
Peaks, the tenants failed to request adequate protection; therefore, the circuit
court authorized a sale of the encumbered land free and clear of their leasehold
interests.7 The Ninth Circuit left open the more difficult question of what it
would have done had the tenant entities sought to protect their rights prior to the
bankruptcy auction.8 Accordingly, no one knows exactly what adequate
protection will look like under § 363(e).9 Only the Southern District of New
York, in Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC (“Dishi & Sons”), has discussed the
adequate protection problem in this context. In Dishi & Sons, the court stated in
dicta that continued possession would have been the appropriate form of
adequate protection under the circumstances.10 However, the Ninth Circuit in
Spanish Peaks suggested that there could—and should—be other forms of
adequate protection, although it did not say what those other forms might be.11
Still, letting the tenants recover anything would not only be contrary to the
Bankruptcy Code’s goal of maximizing creditor recovery,12 but it would also
leave open the loophole that the landlord in Spanish Peaks attempted to
exploit.13
Many judges will soon have to face this adequate protection problem in the
commercial landlord-tenant context, considering that the minority approach
posited by Spanish Peaks, which requires tenants to timely request adequate

5

In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
See, e.g., Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC (In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech
Steel Holdings Corp.), 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003). See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d
at 899 (labelling this approach “the ‘minority’ approach”). Title 11 U.S.C. § 363 provides:
6

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an entity that has
an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee,
the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is
necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.
7

In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 896.
Id. at 900.
9
See Jerald I. Ancel et al., Can A § 363 Sale Dispossess A Tenant Notwithstanding § 365(h)?, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., July/August 2003, at 18, 31. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 899.
10
Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696, 711–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
11
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 892.
8
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protection, appears to be trending.14 Indeed, in Spanish Peaks the Ninth Circuit
became the second of two federal circuit courts of appeals to adopt it.15 Thus,
not only does the minority view now bind at least twelve states and the Western
District of Pennsylvania,16 but the weight of two circuit court opinions suggests
that judges in other parts of the country will begin adopting it as well.17
Therefore, in future landlord bankruptcies, well-informed tenants will likely ask
for adequate protection as a precautionary measure,18 which means that many
judges will soon be forced to provide “adequate protection” for tenants under
§ 363(e).
This Comment explores the open issue of what a bankruptcy judge should
have done had the tenants diligently requested adequate protection in Spanish
Peaks. It proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by providing an overview of the
two approaches to landlord bankruptcies, and then gives the facts of Spanish
Peaks. Next, Part II argues that Spanish Peaks was a result-oriented opinion
aimed at depriving the undeserving tenant entities of adequate protection. Given
the outcome-oriented nature of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, this Comment
explores how a bankruptcy judge could have avoided granting compensation or
continued possession to the tenants, even if they had requested adequate
protection. Finally, Part III asserts that the minority approach is more practical
than the majority approach because it offers judges more flexibility in dealing
with the leases of commercial tenants; it is therefore less vulnerable to
exploitation by sophisticated landlords. This Comment is limited to landlord

14
See id.; In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537; In re Hill, 307
B.R. 821, 825 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004) (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech).
15
See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel
Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537; In re Hill, 307 B.R. at 825 (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech).
16
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin in the Seventh Circuit; Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington in the Ninth Circuit. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872
F.3d 892; In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537; In re Hill, 307 B.R. 821
at 825 (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech).
17
See Robert M. Zinman, Precision in Statutory Drafting: The Qualitech Quagmire and the Sad History
of § 365 (h) of the Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 97, 127 (2004) (stating that “there is a good
possibility that [the law of the Seventh Circuit] will be followed by other courts”). See also In re Hill, 307 B.R.
at 825 (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s minority approach).
18
See Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 700, for a case in which the tenant of a bankrupt landlord requested
adequate protection as precautionary measure. See also Gary F. Torrell, Owner vs. Tenant Rights in a Property
in Bankruptcy, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2018, at 12, 14 (“For tenants of a bankrupt landlord, the lesson to be learned here
is to aggressively pursue and protect one’s rights and request ‘adequate protection’ under Bankruptcy Code
Section 363 when any sale of the underlying real property is proposed free and clear of the tenant’s lease.”);
Alan R. Lepene, Andrew L. Turscak, Jr., & Louis F. Solimine, Ninth Circuit Reignites Debate over Interplay of
Sections 363, 365, L. J. NEWSL. (Oct. 2017), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/
2017/10/01/ninth-circuit-reignites-debate-over-the-interplay-of-sections-363-365/?slreturn=20180201205408.
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bankruptcies in the commercial context and is agnostic with regard to residential
leases.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Two Approaches to Landlord Bankruptcies
1. The Majority Approach
Courts are split on what to do with a commercial tenant’s leasehold interest
when a trustee or debtor-in-possession sells encumbered property in a
bankruptcy sale.19 While the only two circuit courts that have considered the
issue required tenants to request adequate protection prior to the auction to
receive the protections of the Bankruptcy Code,20 most bankruptcy courts and
district courts hold that tenants do not need to do anything to remain in
possession for the duration of the lease.21 For instance, the Bankruptcy Court for
the District of South Carolina in In re Taylor granted the tenant continued
possession until the lease’s expiration.22 In Taylor, the landlord-debtor leased
out his five nursing homes to five related entities, collectively called the
“Magnolia Entities.”23 After filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor made a
motion to sell the five nursing home facilities free and clear of the Magnolia
Entities’ leasehold interests pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1) and (f).24 The
Magnolia Entities objected, and the bankruptcy court faced the issue of whether
§ 363 authorizes a sale of land free and clear of a lessee’s interest.25
Like most lower courts that have considered this issue, the bankruptcy court
denied the landlord-debtor’s request under § 363 to sell the encumbered
properties free and clear of the tenants’ leases.26 Instead, the court held that
§ 365(h) trumps § 363 and thus entitles a tenant in a landlord bankruptcy to elect

19

See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898.
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel
Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537.
21
See, e.g., In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996). See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II,
LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”).
22
In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 142. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing
In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”).
23
In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 144.
24
In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 152.
25
In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 153.
26
In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 168. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing
In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”).
20
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either continued possession or a cause of action for breach of contract.27 In
reaching its conclusion, the court applied two lines of reasoning. First, the court
invoked the canon generalia specialibus non derogant, or a specific provision
prevails over a conflicting general provision.28 Under this interpretive principle,
the court determined that § 365(h), which “specifically references the situation
where the debtor is the lessor and with great particularity sets forth the rights
and duties of the lessor and lessee,” should prevail over the less specific § 363.29
Second, the court looked to the legislative history regarding § 365.30 There, the
court found “a clear intent on the part of Congress to protect a tenant’s estate
when the landlord files bankruptcy.”31 To let a debtor or trustee sell the
encumbered land free and clear of any leasehold interests would, according to
the court, “be in direct contravention of the lessee protections specifically
afforded by § 365,” even if the lessee received compensation for its interest from
the proceeds of the auction.32 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court denied the
debtor’s motion to sell the encumbered land free and clear of the tenant’s lease.33
2. The Minority Approach: Qualitech
While most lower courts follow the holding in Taylor, which entitles tenants
of bankrupt landlords to remain in possession,34 the Seventh Circuit adopted a
different view in 2003.35 Specifically, in a case of first impression at the circuit
level, the Seventh Circuit held in Precision Industries, Inc. v. Qualitech Steel
SBQ, LLC (In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp.)
(“Qualitech”) that prior to a bankruptcy auction, a commercial lessee must
request adequate protection from the bankruptcy judge to prevent the liquidation
of the encumbered property free and clear of the leasehold interest.36 Qualitech
featured a land lease that the Qualitech Steel Corporation and Qualitech Steel
27

In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 at 168.
In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 165. The canon generalia specialibus non derogant provides that a specific
provision prevails over a general provision. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012). Section
365(h)(1)(A) applies to situations in which “the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which
the debtor is the lessor.” It states that “if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights
under such lease . . . for the balance of the term of such lease.” Section 363(f), on the other hand, applies more
broadly to situations in which the trustee “sell[s] property . . . free and clear of any interest in such property.”
29
In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 165 (emphasis in original).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 165–66.
33
Id. at 168.
34
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (labelling this approach “the ‘majority’
approach”).
35
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 540.
36
Id. at 540, 548.
28

BARNHARDT COMMENT_PROOFS

2019]

COMMERCIAL LANDLORD BANKRUPTCIES

1/14/2019 9:09 AM

197

Holdings Corporation (collectively “Qualitech”) entered into with Precision
Industries, Inc. and Circo Leasing Co., LLC (collectively “Precision”) on
February 25, 1999.37 Under the agreement, Qualitech leased land at its Indiana
steel mill facility to Precision for a term of ten years.38 Precision intended to
construct and operate a warehouse on the space to provide on-site supply
services for Qualitech.39 Precision paid nominal rent of $1 per year, and enjoyed
exclusive possession of the warehouse for the term of the lease.40 In exchange,
the lease granted Qualitech the right at the expiration of the term to purchase the
warehouse, its fixtures, and other improvements for $1.41 In reliance on the lease,
Precision built and stocked a warehouse on the steel facility, and Qualitech
began purchasing goods from Precision.42
On March 22, 1999—fewer than four weeks after execution of the lease—
Qualitech filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.43 About three months later, on June
30, 1999, Qualitech sold virtually all of its assets, including the encumbered
land, at auction for $180,000,000 to a group of pre-petition lenders that held the
primary mortgage on the Indiana facility.44 By this time, there were more than
$380,000,000 in claims against Qualitech’s estate.45 Qualitech owed more than
$263,000,000 of this amount to the pre-petition lenders that purchased the
property at auction.46 On August 13, 1999, the bankruptcy court entered an order
approving the sale and directing Qualitech to convey its assets “free and clear of
all liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests” to the purchasers.47 Shortly
thereafter, on August 26, 1999, the purchasers transferred their interest in the
assets to Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC (“New Qualitech”).48 Fatal to its case,
Precision neither objected to the sale nor requested adequate protection.49
After receiving the land, New Qualitech changed the locks on the warehouse
Precision constructed.50 This move led to a dispute between Precision and New
Qualitech over whether Precision still had a leasehold interest in the property
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 540.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 540.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 540 n.1.
Id. at 540 n.2.
Id. at 540–41.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 541.
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following the bankruptcy auction.51 The parties took their dispute to the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Indiana, which resolved the matter
in New Qualitech’s favor under the “unequivocal” language of the sale order.52
Precision appealed, and the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana reversed, applying the majority approach of always granting
continued possession.53 New Qualitech then appealed the district court decision
to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that § 363 extinguished Precision’s possessory
interest in the property.54
The Seventh Circuit adopted the rule that in a landlord bankruptcy, a
commercial tenant must request adequate protection prior to the liquidation of
the encumbered land to avoid losing its leasehold interest.55 Although the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged the South Carolina Bankruptcy Court’s decision
in Taylor,56 it reached the opposite conclusion and held that § 365(h) does not
supersede § 363(f).57 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that the land sale occurred
free and clear of Precision’s lease since Precision failed to timely request
adequate protection.58 The Seventh Circuit gave two main reasons for its
conclusion.59 First, it applied the canon that judges should interpret sections of
the Code so as to avoid conflicts between them.60 The Seventh Circuit thereby
read §§ 363(f) and 365(h) in such a way that they could coexist.61 Because the
court observed that §§ 363(f) and 365(h) lack limiting cross-references found in
other provisions of §§ 363 and 365, it stated under the maxim of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius that Congress seemingly did not intend for § 365(h) to limit
§ 363(f).62 Further, the plain language of § 365(h)(1) restricts it to cases in which
the trustee (or debtor-in-possession) “rejects” a lease, saying nothing about sales
of estate property.63 The court took the view that Congress therefore left the

51

In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 541.
Id.
53
Id. at 542.
54
Id. at 542–43.
55
Id. at 548.
56
Id. at 545, 546, 547.
57
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 546-47.
58
Id. at 548.
59
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537.
60
Id. at 548.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 547 (citing City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994)). The canon expressio
unius est exclusio alterius “instructs that, where a statute designates a form of conduct, the manner of its
performance and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers, courts should infer that all omissions
were intentional exclusions.” 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed.) (2017).
63
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537 at 547 (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(h)(1)(A)).
52
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governance of bankruptcy sales to § 363.64 Second, the Seventh Circuit noted
that § 363 contains its own mechanism of protecting tenants: the adequate
protection provision of § 363(e).65 “Adequate protection,” according to the
court, “does not necessarily guarantee a lessee’s continued possession of the
property, but it does demand, in the alternative, that the lessee be compensated
for the value of its leasehold—typically from the proceeds of the sale.”66 Hence,
the Seventh Circuit arrived at the general rule that:
Where estate property under lease is to be sold, section 363 permits
the sale to occur free and clear of a lessee’s possessory interest—
provided that the lessee (upon request) is granted adequate protection
for its interest. Where the property is not sold, and the debtor remains
in possession thereof but chooses to reject the lease, section 365(h)
comes into play and the lessee retains the right to possess the
property.67

The Seventh Circuit defended its rule by pointing out that this interpretation
honors the Bankruptcy Code’s “twin purposes of maximizing creditor recovery
and rehabilitating the debtor.”68 The court concluded that because Precision
failed to object to the sale or seek adequate protection under § 363(e) prior to
the auction, the trustee properly sold the land free and clear of Precision’s
leasehold interest.69
B. The Reception of Qualitech
Critics and lower courts alike have criticized the Seventh Circuit’s holding
because it yields harsh results, unresolved issues, and potential negative
consequences; relies on questionable statutory construction; and conflicts with
legislative history.70 Thus, for nearly fifteen years, Qualitech had little influence

64

Id.
Id. at 547–48.
66
Id. at 548 (internal citations omitted).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); Daniel J. Ferretti, Note, Eviction
Without Rejection–The Tenant’s Bankruptcy Dilemma: Bankruptcy Code Sections 363(f) and 365(h)(1)(a) and
the Divergent Interpretations of Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC and In re Haskell, 39 CUMB.
L. REV. 707, 723-28 (2009); Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Section 363 Sales Free and Clear of Interests: Why the
Seventh Circuit Erred in Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel, 59 BUS. L. REV. 475 (2004); Zinman, supra
note 17, at 106-18; Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Rejection via Sale of Real Estate: Is Your Leasehold
Interest Protected?, 26 ABI J. 7, 28 (2007); Christopher C. Genovese, Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel:
Easing the Tension Between Sections 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 627
(2004). But see In re Hill, 307 B.R. at 825 (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech).
65
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on lower court holdings outside of the Seventh Circuit.71 For instance, the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts in In re Haskill concluded
that “[i]f it were to [adopt the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning], the provisions of
§ 365(h) would be eviscerated.”72 In Haskill, the landlord-debtor entered into a
ninety-nine year lease with the tenant-hospital with no fixed rent, and granted
the tenant a second mortgage in the land.73 The landlord-debtor subsequently
filed for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.74 In its proposed
repayment plan, the debtor sought to liquidate the encumbered property free and
clear of the tenant’s unexpired lease.75 As of the commencement of the case, the
fair market value of the land at issue was approximately $6,500,000, and the
amount of the first mortgage on the property was approximately $13,000,000.76
The landlord-debtor argued that because the government in an eminent
domain taking could hypothetically compel a lessee to accept a money
satisfaction of its leasehold interest, a trustee could sell the encumbered property
free and clear of the lease under 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5).77 Citing Qualitech, the
debtor further asserted that § 365(h) did not apply, because a court could read
that section to coexist with § 363(f).78 Finally, the debtor insisted that the
tenant’s lien on the property constituted adequate protection of its interest, even
though the debtor’s attorney conceded that the tenant would likely receive no
proceeds from a sale of the land.79
Despite the fact that the Seventh Circuit had recently ruled otherwise,80 the
Massachusetts bankruptcy court held that § 365(f)(5) automatically entitles
tenants of bankrupt landlords to continued possession upon liquidation of the
encumbered property.81 First, the court looked at the legislative history of
§ 365(h), which showed that Congress intended to protect tenants’ estates in
landlord bankruptcies.82 The bankruptcy court reasoned that allowing a trustee
71
See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1. But see In re Hill, 307 B.R. at 825 (adopting the reasoning
set forth in Qualitech).
72
In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 9.
73
Id. at 3–4.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 3.
76
Id. at 5.
77
Id. Section 363(f)(5) provides that “[t]he trustee may sell property . . . free and clear of any interest in
such property of an entity other than the estate, only if . . . such entity could be compelled . . . to accept a money
satisfaction of such interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5).
78
In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 5. See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(h).
79
In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 5.
80
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548.
81
In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 8–10.
82
Id. at 7 (citing In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 165-66 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996)).
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to sell land free and clear of any leasehold interests—as the Seventh Circuit had
done—would dispossess a tenant and would therefore be contrary to the purpose
of § 365(h).83 Second, the court feared that letting the debtor dispossess the
tenant would nullify § 365(h).84 Finally, the lower court noted that if it were to
grant adequate protection under § 363 by replacing the tenant’s leasehold
interest with a lien on the property, the tenant would be unlikely to recover any
proceeds from the bankruptcy sale.85 The court found this outcome
unacceptable, and ultimately granted the lessee continued possession.86 In
arriving at its conclusion, the bankruptcy court in Haskill explicitly rejected the
statutory interpretation and outcome of Qualitech87 and instead adopted the
majority view of always granting continued possession.88
Michael St. Patrick Baxter took the position that the Seventh Circuit wrongly
decided Qualitech on both textual and pragmatic grounds.89 Baxter first wrote
that the Seventh Circuit was incorrect in its view that § 365(h) does not limit
§ 363(f).90 To support this claim, Baxter observed that “the legislative history of
§ 365(h) reveals that Congress has consistently sought to strengthen lessee rights
when [those rights] were threatened by narrow court interpretations.”91 Further,
for purposes of §§ 363(f) and 365(h), a sale that effects the repudiation of a lease
is not different from a sale that rejects a lease.92 The Seventh Circuit’s
conclusion to the contrary effectively nullified § 365(h).93 Additionally, Baxter
argued that the Seventh Circuit erred in reasoning that adequate protection under
§ 363(e) could be an acceptable alternative to continued possession under
§ 365(h).94 He elaborated that “[t]o convert a lessee’s § 365(h) rights to cash
compensation in the form of adequate protection under § 363(e), as suggested
by the Seventh Circuit, would be tantamount to an impermissible cramdown of
the lessee.”95 Finally, Baxter questioned how a court could place a value on a

83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. at 9–10.
86
Id. at 10.
87
Id. at 9.
88
Id.
89
Baxter, supra note 70, at 476 (Baxter is a partner with Covington & Burling LLP in Washington, D.C.,
and an adjunct professor of law at George Washington University School of Law.).
90
Id. at 482 (citing In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp. 327 F.3d at 547).
91
Baxter, supra note 70, at 484 (citing Robert M. Zinman, Landlord’s Lease Rejection and the 1984
Amendments to § 365(h), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 31 (1994)).
92
Id. at 486.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 491.
95
Id.
84
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lost leasehold interest, given that no precedent exists.96 These textual issues with
the Qualitech holding led Baxter to conclude that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly
decided the case.97
Baxter also feared that the Qualitech decision would create a number of
practical problems.98 In particular, Baxter worried that the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning would lead debtors to attempt “stealth rejections of leases” to avoid
the requirements of § 365(h).99 Such rejections “may be devastating to lessees
and real estate lease financiers who rely on the ability of lessees to retain
possession of their leasehold interests in the event of the bankruptcy of the
lessor.”100 At the same time, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion would be an
advantage to the debtor because the debtor would be able to cramdown on the
lessee.101 Hence, Baxter discouraged all courts from following the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Qualitech.102
Professor Robert Zinman specifically responded to Baxter’s arguments.103
While Zinman agreed with Baxter that Qualitech discouraged leasehold
financing and conflicted with the congressional intent of § 365 to protect tenants
in landlord bankruptcies, he pointed out that the Seventh Circuit was correct in
its interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.104 Professor Zinman therefore
concluded that the Seventh Circuit actually reached the right outcome.105
Because a bankrupt landlord in a minority-approach jurisdiction could
essentially ignore § 365(h) and sell encumbered land free and clear of leasehold
interests, Zinman feared that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Qualitech would
“completely disrupt leasehold investments.”106 These effects conflicted with
Congress’s intent “to protect the tenant’s estate and the rights of those with
interests in that estate when the lease is disaffirmed in the landlord’s

96

Baxter, supra note 70, at 491.
Id. at 477.
98
Id. at 495–99.
99
Id. at 496.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 497.
102
Id. at 500. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, Baxter also mentioned that Qualitech “may
have substantial implications for the licensing of intellectual property.” Id. at 475. Specifically, Baxter feared
that Qualitech might “be applied . . . in § 363(f) sales to extinguish the rights of licensees of intellectual property
under § 365(n).” Id. at 477.
103
Zinman, supra note 17 (Robert Zinman is a professor at St. John’s University School of Law.).
104
Id. at 99-101, 127. See also In re Hill, 307 B.R. at 825 (adopting the reasoning set forth in Qualitech).
105
Zinman, supra note 17, at 127. Baxter reached this conclusion based on the language of the Bankruptcy
Code.
106
Id. at 99–100.
97
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bankruptcy.”107 Congress did not intend “that the landlord could easily avoid
these protections by employing § 363 in lieu of § 365.”108 Nevertheless, based
on the text of the Bankruptcy Code, the Seventh Circuit held that a landlord
could do just that.109
Even though Zinman believed that the Qualitech decision conflicted with
congressional intent, he found that the Seventh Circuit did not err in its textual
analysis of the interplay between §§ 365(h) and 363.110 Indeed, the canon that
generalia specialibus non derogant—the canon on which the majority of lower
courts relied—only applies when two provisions deal with the same situation
and produce different results.111 Sections 363 and 365 deal with distinct
circumstances.112 As such, Zinman agreed with the Seventh Circuit that § 365
should not trump § 363.113 To support his conclusion, Zinman pointed out that
“[§§ 363 and 365] are clear and make no reference to each other,” while other
Bankruptcy Code sections contain careful references to any other conflicting
provisions.114 The rule that expressio unius est exclusio alterius suggests that
Congress purposefully omitted limiting cross-references, and thus intended that
§§ 363 and 365 would not conflict.115
Zinman went on to expressly refute Baxter’s argument that the Seventh
Circuit had misinterpreted the text of the Bankruptcy Code.116 Whereas Baxter
found § 363(l) to evidence Congress’s intent to subordinate all of § 363 to
§ 365,117 Zinman claimed that § 363(l) only applies to limited circumstances,
and thus only conflicts with certain clauses of § 365.118 Additionally, “to put the
‘subject to’ language in the provision designed to deal with ipso facto clauses in
107

Id. at 118.
Id.
109
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537.
110
Zinman, supra note 17, at 100, 127.
111
Id. at 124. The canon generalia specialibus non derogant provides that a specific provision prevails
over a general provision. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 568 U.S. at 21.
112
Zinman, supra note 17, at 124. According to Zinman, “[u]nder § 365, the landlord retains ownership
of the property, while under [§] 363, the landlord disposes of the fee interest either subject to, or free and clear
of the lease.”
113
Id.
114
Id. at 125. As an example, Zinman examined the cross-references contained in § 363(d).
115
Id. The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius “instructs that, where a statute designates a form of
conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers, courts should
infer that all omissions were intentional exclusions.” 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th
ed.) (2017).
116
Zinman, supra note 17, at 125–27.
117
Baxter, supra note 70, at 484; Zinman, supra note 17, at 125-26.
118
Zinman, supra note 17, at 125-27.
108
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an attempt to subordinate all of § 363 to § 365,” as Baxter argued Congress had
done, “would simply constitute illogical drafting.”119 Even though Zinman
disagreed with Baxter that the Seventh Circuit had errantly interpreted §§ 363
and 365, he questioned whether the Qualitech result was correct in practice and
reflective of the spirit of § 365 to protect tenants.120 Accordingly, Zinman called
on Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code to offer greater tenant protection in
landlord bankruptcies.121
Scholars and attorneys have also criticized Qualitech for its negative realworld implications and its unresolved issues.122 For example, one critic argued
that Qualitech was contrary to Congress’s intent to protect lessees in landlord
bankruptcies, since the Seventh Circuit allowed a debtor-in-possession to
effectively dispossess a tenant that had already greatly invested in the
property.123 Likewise, another critic noted that the protections afforded tenants
under § 363 are inferior to those of § 365, and as such developer tenants may be
reluctant to take the risk of developing or improving leased property.124 Finally,
one lawyer simply noted that Qualitech failed to define precisely what adequate
protection would look like.125
C. Adequate Protection under Dishi & Sons
To date, only the Southern District of New York in Dishi & Sons has
considered adequate protection in the landlord bankruptcy context, which the
court stated in dicta that it would have provided to the tenant in the form of
continued possession.126 While Dishi & Sons offers some guidance, the Ninth
Circuit’s discussion in Spanish Peaks suggests that other forms of adequate
protection exist.127 Dishi & Sons involved a lease between the landlord, a
majority owner of two commercial condominium units, and the tenant of one of
those units, a pub called The Ginger Man (“TGM”).128 The landlord owed a
119

Id. at 127.
Id. at 100, 167 ; Baxter, supra note 70, at 484.
121
Zinman, supra note 17, at 100, 167.
122
See Ferretti, supra note 70, at 726-27; Genovese, supra note 70, at 643, 646-47; Ancel et
al., supra note 9, at 31.
123
Ferretti, supra note 70, at 726-27.
124
Genovese, supra note 70, at 646-47.
125
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d 537. See also Genovese, supra
note 70, at 641; Ancel et al., supra note 9, at 31.
126
Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. 696. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900 (citing
only Dishi & Sons as authority on the issue of fashioning adequate protection for a tenant in the landlord
bankruptcy context).
127
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 899.
128
Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 699.
120

BARNHARDT COMMENT_PROOFS

2019]

COMMERCIAL LANDLORD BANKRUPTCIES

1/14/2019 9:09 AM

205

creditor approximately $13,500,000 on these condominium units, with the
creditor securing its interest with a mortgage on the property.129 After the
landlord-debtor filed a petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, it filed a chapter 11 plan proposing to sell the condominium unit free and
clear of TGM’s lease.130 Dishi & Sons (“Dishi”) then purchased the property—
purportedly free and clear of TGM’s interest—at a bankruptcy auction with a
bid of $6,075,000.131 Before the bankruptcy court confirmed the landlord’s
chapter 11 plan and approved the sale, TGM requested continued possession for
the duration of the lease under § 365(h) or, alternatively, adequate protection
under § 363(e).132
The district court adopted the majority position and determined that § 365
entitled TGM to continued possession until the lease’s expiration.133 However,
the court took a belt-and-suspenders approach and also addressed—in dicta—
Dishi’s argument that the bankruptcy court had erred in granting TGM continued
possession under § 363(e).134 Dishi asserted that adequate protection should
have instead taken the form of a sum of money or possession for a limited term,
since these solutions would be more fair to the purchaser.135 The court rejected
Dishi’s arguments, first noting that “§ 363(e) is focused upon protecting the
entity whose interest is threatened, not other creditors or the purchaser.”136 The
court then gave the rule that “[w]here it is improbable that the lessee will receive
any compensation for its interest from proceeds of the sale, and it is difficult to
value the lessee’s unique property interest . . . ‘adequate protection can be
achieved only through continued possession of the leased premises.’”137
Because the landlord-debtor owed significantly more on the property than what
the property was worth, TGM probably would not have received any
compensation from the bankruptcy sale.138 Additionally, the district judge found
TGM’s leasehold interest difficult to value.139 Hence, the court concluded that
had it been forced to provide adequate protection to TGM, continued possession
would have been the proper solution.140
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 711-12 (quoting In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 10).
Id. at 712.
Id.
Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 712.
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D. Spanish Peaks: Facts and Holding
In July 2017, the Ninth Circuit became only the second circuit court to deal
with a tenant’s leasehold interest in the bankruptcy liquidation of a landlord’s
encumbered property.141 To avoid inequitable results in the case of Spanish
Peaks, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Qualitech,
despite that decision’s unpopularity.142 Had the appellate court in Spanish Peaks
adopted the majority approach of always allowing lessees to remain in
possession for the duration of the lease, the founders of a bankrupt business
would have recovered millions of dollars at the expense of their creditors.143 The
Seventh Circuit’s minority approach of requiring tenants to request adequate
protection to prevent a sale free and clear of encumbrances enabled the Ninth
Circuit to close the loophole—at least this one time.144 Indeed, near the end of
the opinion, the judges hinted that they did not know how they would have
stopped the founders from exploiting the bankruptcy process by recovering
millions of dollars at the expense of creditors had those founders diligently
requested adequate protection.145 Thus, while the Ninth Circuit’s result-oriented
approach prevented unjust results in Spanish Peaks, it remains unclear how
judges will achieve similar outcomes in the future.146
Spanish Peaks involved Spanish Peaks Holdings, LLC (“SPH”), the owner
of a 5,700-acre Montana ski resort; and two of its tenants.147 The resort was “the
brainchild of James J. Dolan, Jr., and Timothy L. Blixseth,” who obtained
financing for the project by obtaining a $130,000,000 loan secured by a
mortgage and assignment of rents.148 Spanish Peaks Acquisition Partners, LLC
(“SPAP”), ultimately ended up with the note and mortgage.149 The resort
featured a number of specialized entities that owned and managed its
amenities.150 These entities included The Pinnacle Restaurant at Big Sky, LLC
(“Pinnacle”); and Montana Opticom, LLC (“Montana Opticom”), a

141

In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
Id. See also Vicki R. Harding, Sale Free and Clear of Lease: The Battle Between Section 363 and 365,
BANKRUPTCY-REALESTATE-INSIGHTS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://bankruptcy-realestate-insights.com/2018/01/31/
sale-free-and-clear-of-lease-the-battle-between-section-363-and-section-365/ (“In [Spanish Peaks] it is likely
that the [tenant entities’] blatant attempt to favor insiders made it more appealing to find in favor of the buyer.”).
143
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. See also Harding, supra note 142.
144
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 894.
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Id.
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telecommunications company.151 Both entities had leasehold interests in SPH’s
land.152 Specifically, in 2006 Pinnacle entered into a ninety-nine-year lease with
SPH, agreeing to pay rent of $1,000 per year in exchange for restaurant space.153
Three years later, in 2009, SPH entered into a lease with Montana Opticom for
a term of sixty years, with an annual rent of $1,285.154 Dolan served as an officer
of both SPH and Pinnacle, and was the sole member of Montana Opticom.155 In
these capacities, he signed the Pinnacle lease as both the lessor and the lessee,
and the Montana Opticom lease as the lessee.156 Notably, the mortgage securing
SPH’s $130,000,000 loan was senior to these two leases.157 It is also important
that neither tenant had a Subordination, Non-disturbance, and Attornment
(“SNDA”) agreement with the mortgagee or with the landlord.158
The Pinnacle lease provided that “[a]ll improvements constructed on the
Premises by [the lessee, Spanish Peaks Development, LLC] shall be owned by
[the lessee]” and that “any permanent improvements described in [the Pinnacle
lease] shall become and remain [the lessor’s (Spanish Peaks Holdings, LLC’s)]
property.”159 Despite any improvements that the lessees may have made to the
restaurant space, in April 2011, Dolan and the Pinnacle Restaurant at Big Sky,
LLC closed the doors to the Pinnacle Restaurant.160 As of March 10, 2014—the
day on which the bankruptcy court issued its order—they still had not reopened
them.161 The Montana Opticom lease provided for Montana Opticom to place
telecommunication towers around the resort so that members of the Spanish
Peaks club could have access to telephone and related services.162 Presumably,
Montana Opticom did just that.
151

Id. at 894–95.
Id.
153
Id. at 894. The lease was actually between SPH and Spanish Peaks Development, LLC, but in 2008
Spanish Peaks Development, LLC, assigned its interest to Pinnacle Restaurant. Moreover, as originally drafted,
the lease provided that Spanish Peaks Development would pay SPH $1,000 per month through November 30,
2007, and beginning December 1, 2007, the monthly payments would increase by a specified percentage. In re
Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, No. 12-60041-7, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *11 (Bankr. D. Mont. Mar. 10,
2014) (subsequent history omitted). Spanish Peaks Developments and SPH terminated that lease on December
14, 2007 and replaced it with the ninety-nine-year lease with annual rent of $1,000. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings
II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *11.
154
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 895.
155
Id. at 894.
156
Id. at 894-95 (9th Cir. 2017); In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *11.
157
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 896.
158
Ninth Circuit Allows Lease Stripping in Bankruptcy, Practical Law Legal Update w-009-3321 (West)
(hereinafter “Practical Legal Update”).
159
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *9.
160
Id. at *12.
161
Id.
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Id. at *11.
152

BARNHARDT COMMENT_PROOFS

208

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

1/14/2019 9:09 AM

[Vol. 35

When SPH filed a petition for chapter 7 bankruptcy on October 14, 2011, it
still owed SPAP $122,000,000 on the $130,000,000 loan.163 After the
commencement of SPH’s bankruptcy case, SPAP assigned its interest to CH SP
Acquisitions, LLC (“CH SP”).164 On June 3, 2013, the trustee sold SPH’s land
at auction to CH SP for $26,100,000.165 Ten days later, on June 13, 2013, the
bankruptcy court entered an order approving the sale.166 This order provided that
the trustee had sold the land free and clear of any leases.167 After a hearing on
the issue of whether the order preserved the leasehold rights of Pinnacle and
Montana Opticom, the bankruptcy court held that it did not.168 In reaching its
conclusion, the bankruptcy court noted that neither Pinnacle nor Montana
Opticom had requested adequate protection for their leasehold interests before
the bankruptcy auction.169 The bankruptcy judge further found that: “Pinnacle
had not operated a restaurant on the property since 2011,” “Pinnacle’s rent was
far below the property’s fair market rental value of $40,000 to $100,000 per
year,”170 and “the leases were executed ‘at a time when all parties involved were
controlled by James J. Dolan.’”171
The District Court for the District of Montana affirmed,172 and Pinnacle and
Montana Opticom appealed.173 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit became the second
(of two) circuit courts to take the minority view when it held that “the Pinnacle
and [Montana] Opticom leases [had not] survived the sale of the property to
CH SP.”174 The court reached this result by incorporating by reference the
Seventh Circuit’s “sound textual analysis” of the interplay between §§ 363 and
365 in Qualitech.175 The Ninth Circuit added to this reasoning two observations
to support its position that § 363 should govern.176 First, the Ninth Circuit
pointed out that § 363(f) authorizes a free-and-clear sale if applicable

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 895.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 896.
Id. There were certain exceptions to the free-and-clear sale, but none of them apply here.
Id.
Id.
Under the lease, Pinnacle agreed to pay rent of $1,000 per month for a term of ninety-nine years. Id. at

894.
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Id. at 896.
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, No. BR 12-60041, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77921, at *4 (D.
Mont. 2015).
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In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
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Id. at 896.
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nonbankruptcy law permits such a sale.177 Under Montana law, “a foreclosure
sale to satisfy a mortgage terminates a subsequent lease on the mortgaged
property.”178 Given that CH SP held a mortgage on the property securing the
debt owed to it of $122,000,000, the court noted that but for SPH’s bankruptcy
filing, CH SP would have foreclosed on the property and thereby terminated all
encumbrances.179 Second, the court added that while § 365 does reflect a
congressional intent to protect tenants in landlord bankruptcies, the Code also
seeks to “maximiz[e] creditor recovery.”180 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
only the minority approach balances these “competing purposes in the way
Congress intended.”181 Because Pinnacle and Montana Opticom had failed to
request adequate protection prior to the bankruptcy auction, the Ninth Circuit
held that the bankruptcy and district courts had properly authorized a sale of the
resort free and clear of the Pinnacle and Montana Opticom leases.182
Although the Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion quite easily under the
Seventh Circuit’s bright-line requirements for requesting adequate protection, in
dicta it confessed that it did not know what it would have done had the tenants
diligently sought to protect their rights.183 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit remarked
that “[s]ince Pinnacle and [Montana] Opticom did not ask for adequate
protection until after the sale had taken place . . . the question of what protection
the bankruptcy court could have or should have awarded is not before us.”184
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the district court in Dishi & Sons
would have fashioned adequate protection in the form of continued
possession,185 the words “could have” here suggest that the Ninth Circuit
envisioned other forms of adequate protection.186 As for what those additional
forms might be, the court did not say.187 However, the words “should have” hint
that the Ninth Circuit found adequate protection in the form of continued
possession inappropriate under the facts.188 The court’s decision to adopt the
Seventh Circuit’s heavily criticized minority approach of requiring tenants to
177

Id. at 899–900.
Id. at 900 (citing Ruby Valley Nat’l Bank v. Wells Fargo Delaware Trust Co., 317 P.3d 174, 178 (Mont.
2014); Williard v. Campbell, 11 P.2d 782, 787 (Mont. 1932)).
179
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900.
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Id. at 901 (quoting In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 901.
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Id. at 900.
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In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900 (citing Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 711-12).
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request adequate protection suggests that Spanish Peaks was a result-oriented
opinion.189 The minority approach, despite its unpopularity, provided the court
with a way to prevent debtor-affiliated entities from exploiting one-sided leases
to the detriment of the creditors.190
II. ANALYSIS
A. Spanish Peaks: A Result-Oriented Opinion
The reason why the Ninth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s unpopular
approach of requiring tenants to request adequate protection to receive
compensation or continued possession lies in the case’s facts.191 Specifically,
had the court taken the more prevalent view among the lower courts that tenants
are always entitled to continued possession, two undeserving individuals would
have gotten a tremendous financial windfall at the expense of their resort’s
legitimate creditors. Worse, future land developers would have begun exploiting
the same loophole, encouraging further inequity.
The earliest hint of a result-oriented outcome came in the opening sentence
of the opinion when the Ninth Circuit mentioned Timothy Blixseth as one of the
visionaries behind the Spanish Peaks project.192 Blixseth, an ex-billionaire real
estate mogul, ended up in solitary confinement in a Montana jail for fourteen
months for civil contempt of court for disobeying an order of a United States
district judge to not sell a separate resort in Mexico.193 Now out of jail, Blixseth
is still in financial trouble for his development of the Yellowstone Club, an elite
ski resort neighboring the Spanish Peaks resort.194 Blixseth’s creditors for the
Yellowstone Club are pursuing him for approximately $250,000,000.195 They
claim he borrowed $375,000,000 for the Yellowstone Club development and

189

Id. at 899.
Id. at 894. See also Harding, supra note 142.
191
See Harding, supra note 142.
192
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 894. Nowhere else in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion or
in the Bankruptcy Court’s order does Blixseth’s name appear.
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Rick Anderson, Billionaire Who Went Bust Is Out of Jail and Still Owes Millions. Many Are Watching
His Next Move, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-bankrupt-billionaire20160715-snap-story.html; Phil Drake, What Will Tim Blixseth Do With His Freedom?, GREAT FALLS TRIB.,
(July 7, 2016, 6:28 PM), http://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/local/2016/07/07/exclusive-blixsethhopes-end-near-legal-saga/86825334/.
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Phil Drake, From Billionaire to Inmate, Yellowstone Club Founder Remains Defiant, GREAT FALLS
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then pocketed much of the loan.196 The creditors are having significant issues:
Blixseth’s millions have gone missing.197 As Blixseth said about the money, “I
think that [a lot of it is offshore], but I don’t know where it is.”198 Even though
the Ninth Circuit judges ordered Blixseth’s release from jail,199 the fact that he
was a visionary behind the Spanish Peaks ski resort may have made the judges
suspicious from the start about the tenants’ worthiness of continued possession
or compensation.
The values that the Ninth Circuit mentioned in the case add further evidence
that the judges were looking to deprive the tenants of continued possession in
Spanish Peaks.200 The Ninth Circuit specifically noted that Pinnacle’s $1,000
annual rent was up to $99,000 less than the fair market annual rental value of the
leased parcel of land.201 To grant continued possession for approximately ninetytwo years—the remaining period on the lease at the time of the 2013 bankruptcy
sale—would have therefore deprived the purchaser of an opportunity to earn up
to $92,000,000 in rent.202 Ignoring any possible deductions or exemptions, it
would also deny the Government the opportunity to tax up to $92,000,000 of
income as opposed to a meager $92,000.203 Moreover, given that the fair market
rental value of the leased restaurant space was estimated at up to $100,000 per
year, the lessee could presumably sell the right to use and enjoy the space for
ninety-two years for a large sum of money. Recalling that Dolan controlled both
the restaurant and SPH at the time the lease was executed,204 he presumably
would have been the one to profit on a sale of Pinnacle’s remaining interest in
the resort property.205 The fact that Dolan fought so hard for continued
possession for a boarded-up restaurant suggests that he was seeking a buyout
from the purchaser in an amount exceeding his legal fees incurred in taking the
dispute all the way to the Ninth Circuit.206 Indeed, pursuant to the restaurant
196

Id.
Daniel Fisher, Former Billionaire Tim Blixseth Jailed Over Missing Funds, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2014,
10:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/12/18/former-billionaire-tim-blixseth-jailed-overmissing-funds/#75fca9e476ae.
198
Id.
199
Drake, supra note 193.
200
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. See also Harding, supra note 142.
201
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 896.
202
$92,000,000 is the aggregation of $100,000 of annual rent for ninety-two years.
203
$92,000 is the aggregation of $1,000 of annual rent for ninety-two years.
204
Id.
205
Harding, supra note 142.
206
See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. Dolan could have also been looking to reopen
the restaurant to profit on the subsequent developers’ investments in the resort. Given that Dolan closed Pinnacle
years before the Spanish Peaks Resort filed for bankruptcy, id. at 896 , this possibility seems less likely than the
possibility that Dolan was just seeking a buyout.
197
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lease, Dolan had a right to encumber valuable space on the resort for more than
ninety years at nominal rent of $1,000.207 Any subsequent owner of the land
would thus have a strong incentive to buy out the lessees rather than allow
continued possession at monthly rent of approximately $1,000.
The location of Pinnacle within the Spanish Peaks Resort and the nature of
Montana Opticom’s business is further evidence that Dolan was just seeking a
buyout. As pre-bankruptcy maps of the resort show, Pinnacle sat atop Andesite
Mountain at a point of convergence of multiple ski lift lines and the point of
origin of multiple ski runs.208 Pinnacle was the only business operating on the
Andesite Mountain summit.209 From this central location of the resort, Dolan
could have used the restaurant entity’s leasehold interest to try to sabotage the
resort’s purchaser. For instance, Dolan could have allowed the restaurant
building to fall into a state of disrepair, thereby deterring skiers from visiting
Andesite Mountain at all.210 Relatedly, Dolan could have used the Montana
Opticom lease to cut off all telecommunications to the remote resort, making it
an undesirable destination for vacationers. Absent any possible (and unlikely)
provisions in the lease imposing duties on the tenants, and ignoring any potential
common law claims, the subsequent owners of the resort would have likely had
no recourse against the tenant entities.211 Worse, the more damage Dolan could
have inflicted upon the purchaser, the more he would have been able to demand
in a buyout. Dolan could have therefore used the restaurant entity’s leasehold

207
Id. at 894. See Spanish Peaks Resort, SKIMAP.ORG (Feb. 3, 2012), https://skimap.org/skiAreas/view/
1026, for the precise location of Pinnacle Restaurant on the Spanish Peaks Resort. The 2007 map indicates that
the Pinnacle Restaurant was on Andesite Mountain. The 2010 map shows the ski runs on Andesite Mountain, as
well as the restaurant.
208
See About Spanish Peaks, SPANISH PEAKS MOUNTAIN CLUB (2015), http://spanishpeaks.
findyourbigsky.com/about-spanish-peaks/; Spanish Peaks Resort, SKIMAP.ORG (Feb. 3, 2012), https://skimap.
org/skiAreas/view/1026.
209
Id.
210
One could easily imagine more colorful (and more effective) ways in which Dolan could have deterred
vacationers from visiting Andesite Mountain.
211
Eviction would be a check on what Dolan could do, but unless Dolan actually triggered a ground for
eviction under Montana law, this remedy would be unavailable to the landlord. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-422.
The grounds for eviction in Montana include: (1) noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement; (2)
failure to pay rent; (3) destruction, defacement, damage, impairment, or removal of any part of the premises by
the tenant; and (4) creation of a reasonable potential by the tenant that the premises may be damaged or destroyed
or that neighboring tenants may be injured. Id. Given the nominal rent of the leases at issue in Spanish Peaks, In
re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 894, failure to pay rent would almost certainly not be grounds
for eviction. Likewise, given that Dolan controlled the parties on both sides of the leases, there were probably
no robust obligations on the tenant entities. Ground (1) would be unlikely to be triggered. Grounds (3) and (4)
would be possible if Dolan tried use the tenant leases to cause problems in an effort to negotiate a larger buyout.
However, with good legal counsel, a tenant could easily avoid triggering § 70-24-422. Accordingly, eviction
rights are unlikely to fully protect landlords.
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interest to hold the entire mountain hostage, causing problems until the
subsequent owner agreed to buy his entities out of the leases. From the
purchaser’s perspective, it would be far better to just have a court fashion
adequate protection in the form of compensation than to grant the tenant
continued possession and leave it to the lease parties to reach an agreement
outside of the bankruptcy proceedings.212 Accordingly, purchasers would likely
bid more for land at auction in a jurisdiction that applied the minority
approach.213 Higher bids honor the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of maximizing
creditor recovery.214 At the same time, adequate protection ensures that tenants’
property interests are protected.215 Hence, the minority view balances the
competing purposes of the Code better than the majority view.216
Had the court granted continued possession, the need to make such a buyout
would have presumably reduced the amount the mortgagee could have recovered
from the bankruptcy sale.217 Creating a need to make a buyout would have failed
to honor the Bankruptcy Code’s purpose of maximizing creditor recovery.218
Indeed, there are three ways a tenant could receive a buyout following a
bankruptcy auction, all of which detract from creditor recovery. First, the
mortgagee, CH SP, could itself buy out the lessees, which would be functionally
equivalent to CH SP having to pay an increased price for the property at the
bankruptcy sale. Second, CH SP could sell the property before dealing with the
remaining tenants. Here, however, the encumbrance would reduce the amount a
buyer would be willing to pay. Finally, a party other than the mortgagee could
purchase the property at auction at a reduced price due to the need to buyout the
212
Adequate protection could likely take the form of continued possession. See In re Qualitech Steel Corp.
& Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548 (internal citations omitted); Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. 696.
Under the minority view, if the bankruptcy judge determines that the tenant entity is only requesting continued
possession to seek a large buyout, the judge can fashion adequate protection in the form of compensation. See
In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548 (internal citations omitted) (stating
that adequate protection should take the form of compensation if not continued possession).
213
See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900 (“To some extent, . . . estate property
presumably fetches a lower price if it is subject to a lease.”).
214
Id. at 900–01 (calling it a “core purpose of the Code” to “maximiz[e] creditor recovery”).
215
Id. at 900.
216
See id. at 894, 901 (calling the protection of tenants and the maximization of creditor recovery the “core
purpose[s]” of the Bankruptcy Code).
217
See id. at 900–01 (noting that “[t]o some extent, protecting lessees reduces the value of the estate—
property presumably fetches a lower price if it is subject to a lease—and is therefore contrary to the goal of
maximizing creditor recovery, another core purpose of the Code” (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
218
See id. (noting that “[t]o some extent, protecting lessees reduces the value of the estate—property
presumably fetches a lower price if it is subject to a lease—and is therefore contrary to the goal of maximizing
creditor recovery, another core purpose of the Code” (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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unwanted tenants. Letting the same individual whose ski resort filed for
bankruptcy recover a large sum of money from the two leases following the
auction would have been a tremendous abuse of the bankruptcy system. By
adopting the Seventh Circuit’s approach of requiring tenants to request adequate
protection, the Ninth Circuit found an easy way to simultaneously maximize
creditor recovery and foil Dolan’s scheme to use his tenant entities’ one-sided
leases to negotiate an unfair buyout.219
The Ninth Circuit likewise avoided granting the tenants a right to recover
proceeds from the auction at the expense of SPH’s legitimate creditors, which
also would have been unjust.220 Indeed, both companies’ leases arose after SPH
obtained the $130,000,000 loan, and the same individual who founded and
controlled the bankrupt ski resort also controlled each of the tenants.221 Letting
Dolan wedge the claims of Pinnacle and Montana Opticom in front of the
secured claim of the senior mortgagee is thus not an especially attractive
solution.222 The Ninth Circuit in Spanish Peaks had a fairly easy escape valve:
by taking the Seventh Circuit’s established approach to §§ 363 and 365, the
appellate judges managed to evade having to fashion adequate protection at
all.223 While that solution worked in Spanish Peaks, it will probably not work in
future cases since tenants will likely begin requesting adequate protection in
almost all landlord bankruptcies.224 Thus, in cases where undeserving tenants
with bad intentions diligently request adequate protection, judges will be trapped
between the Scylla of continued possession and the Charybdis of
compensation.225

219

In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. See also Harding, supra note 142.
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
221
Id. at 896.
222
See Harding, supra note 142.
223
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898.
224
See Torrell, supra note 18, at 14 (“For tenants of a bankrupt landlord, the lesson to be learned here is
to aggressively pursue and protect one’s rights and request ‘adequate protection’ under Bankruptcy Code Section
363 when any sale of the underlying real property is proposed free and clear of the tenant’s lease.”); Harding,
supra note 142 (“From the viewpoint of a tenant, the clear message is that it should object early and often, and
in particular, should push for adequate protection (getting creative if necessary).”).
225
Scylla and Charybdis were, “in Greek mythology, two immortal and irresistible monsters who beset
the narrow waters traversed by the hero Odysseus in his wanderings described in Homer’s Odyssey, Book XII .
. . . To be ‘between Scylla and Charybdis’ means to be caught between two equally unpleasant alternatives.”
Scylla and Charybdis, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Scylla-and-Charybdis (last visited Nov.
17, 2018).
220
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B. Limiting Adequate Protection for Undeserving Tenants
Had the tenants in Spanish Peaks diligently requested adequate protection
prior to the bankruptcy auction, the bankruptcy judge would have faced the task
of fashioning a remedy for two commercial tenants that deserved nothing. This
situation will arise in cases where someone is trying to exploit the bankruptcy
system, such as in Spanish Peaks where James Dolan controlled the parties on
both sides of an extremely one-sided lease.226 The easy solution would be for the
judge to simply terminate the lease, thereby raising more money for the debtor’s
legitimate creditors and allowing the purchaser to take the land free and clear of
the encumbrance. However, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits such a solution.227 Likewise, courts are
unlikely to grant a security interest in property that is already totally
encumbered, since this solution would leave the tenant with little or nothing in
exchange for its property interest.228 Judges will accordingly have to use a bit
more creativity to minimize adequate protection for commercial tenants that
deserve nothing.
The solution to granting undeserving tenants adequate protection really just
involves adjusting the value placed on the leasehold interest. For instance, to
minimize Pinnacle’s ability to recover from the bankruptcy sale of the ski resort
in Spanish Peaks, the judge could give credence to an expert who values the
leasehold interest as that of a long out-of-business restaurant located on a failed
ski resort on a steep, remote mountaintop.229 Likewise, the expert could regard
Montana Opticom as a company providing telecommunications services to a
boarded-up ski resort.230 Perhaps the expert could even factor in the nominal rent
that the two entities paid to the landlord entity.231 An expert who looked at the
businesses in this light would surely estimate that the leases were worth far less
than would an expert who considered the earning potential of Pinnacle and
Montana Opticom should the ski resort reopen. It would only be incumbent on
the ski resort’s purchaser to find an expert who would produce such numbers.
226

In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892. See also Harding, supra note 142.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH
FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSES 124 (4th ed. 2015). Under Montana law, a term of years
is an interest in real property. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-15-202; Ditto v. Kipp, 300 Mont. 278, 282 (2000) (“A
leasehold interest in land is an estate for years which is classified as an interest in real property.”).
228
See In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. at 5, 9-10 (rejecting the debtor’s argument that the court could just
give the tenant a security interest in the totally encumbered hospital in exchange for the lost leasehold interest
on the ground that the tenant would likely recover nothing from such a lien).
229
See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77921, at *12.
230
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
231
Id. at 894–95.
227
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Given that the Bankruptcy Code’s standard for placing a value on real property,
found in 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1), is extremely malleable,232 finding such an expert
should not be exceedingly difficult. After placing a low value on the leases, the
judge could grant the tenants adequate protection in the form of a lien on
property of the debtor233 (assuming the debtor has property that is not totally
encumbered).234 Although the tenants would recover some proceeds, in this way
the judge could minimize the impact of tenant recovery on the debtor’s other,
lower-priority creditors, all while avoiding violation of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.235
The appellate process presents one obstacle to this solution, although
observant judges will be able to overcome this hurdle. The standard of review
on appeal of valuation is de novo,236 meaning the bankruptcy judge’s valuation
of the leasehold interests will get no deference. Hence, for the bankruptcy
judge’s strategy to hold, any appellate judges would have to recognize the
bankruptcy judge’s true reason for placing a low value on the lost leasehold
interests. A surprisingly low valuation might in itself work to ensure this result
by inspiring subsequent judges to investigate why the bankruptcy judge
produced such a low value.237 Should the bankruptcy judge’s determination
232
See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 227, at 75-78. Section 506(a)(1) provides that the value of a
claim secured by real property “shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed
disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan
affecting such creditor’s interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2016).
233
In the case of a ski resort such as the Spanish Peaks resort, this property might include snowmobiles,
trucks, rental ski equipment, and furniture from the hotel. Such assets would likely have enough value to
accommodate both a small debt to the tenants and part of the claims of the other creditors. A clever judge would
assess the value of all the debtor’s unencumbered property prior to placing a value on the tenant’s leases to
ensure that the other creditors would still recover something on their unsecured claims.
234
Additional difficulties will arise if all of the debtor’s property is totally encumbered by security
interests. For example, suppose the resort entity’s only assets were the land and the snowmobiles, and that both
the land and the snowmobiles were totally encumbered. In this case, the judge would have no way to provide
compensation to the tenant without displacing the senior liens of the mortgage holder and the creditor(s) with
security interests in the snowmobiles. See Baxter, supra note 70, at 490. Short of finding some way to invalidate
the leases, a judge might have to grant continued possession in such a situation.
235
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 227, at 124. The judge
could also use his/her discretion to vary adequate protection with this method. Indeed, should the judge think
that a particular tenant deserves continued possession for less than the full duration of the lease, the judge could
reduce the term of years and provide the tenant with compensation for the time lost. Such a solution would avoid
hardships resulting from immediate dispossession, raise creditor recovery, and allow the purchaser to use the
land for a different purpose sooner.
236
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033(d) (2018).
237
Although having faith in appellate judges to pick up on a bankruptcy judge’s unstated reasoning is not
a perfect solution, it at least seems to have worked in Spanish Peaks. In that case, both the bankruptcy judge and
the Ninth Circuit judges seem to have recognized that Dolan was trying to exploit the bankruptcy system with
his tenant entities and their one-sided leases. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Spanish
Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913. See also Harding, supra note 142. Indeed, both the Bankruptcy

BARNHARDT COMMENT_PROOFS

2019]

COMMERCIAL LANDLORD BANKRUPTCIES

1/14/2019 9:09 AM

217

stand, the tenants would then only collect on the liquidation of the property
securing their small claim (assuming there was enough value in the debtor’s
other property for them to fully recover, and assuming they did not also hold
some other claim).
This solution of placing a low value on the leasehold estate and securing that
debt with a lien on property of the debtor would benefit the debtor’s other
creditors and the purchaser of the liquidated property. The purchaser would take
the land unencumbered, which would avoid the problem of the tenants sitting on
their long leasehold interests and nominal rent in an effort to receive a large
buyout. Additionally, the fact that the land would no longer come with a bad
bargain would presumably raise the purchase price at auction, benefitting the
other creditors.238 By contrast, in a jurisdiction that follows the majority
approach, a judge would have to grant continued possession,239 which would
lower the purchase price at auction and thereby generate less money for the
creditors.240 Thus, the minority approach of fashioning adequate protection for
tenants can produce much better outcomes for creditors and purchasers than the
majority approach of always granting continued possession.
The solution proposed in this Comment, of valuing leasehold interests based
on the tenants’ worthiness of adequate protection, would also close the loophole
in the majority approach.241 Specifically, by giving undeserving tenants the
smallest justifiable recovery for their prematurely terminated leasehold interests,
a judge could deter individuals from arranging real estate developments in the
same way Dolan did.242 Although this Comment’s solution may still allow
tenants to recover some money from the bankruptcy liquidation of the landlord
entity’s assets, the tenants would recover much less than they might if they
received continued possession. Consequently, in minority-approach
jurisdictions that adopt this Comment’s suggestions, the loophole that Dolan was
attempting to exploit will become much less lucrative. Indeed, founding a
number of separate entities, and preparing leases for each tenant entity to enter
into with the landlord entity, would involve too much time, effort, and legal fees.
Hence, the minority approach, coupled with the solution proposed in this
Court and the Federal Court of Appeals authorized a sale of the ski resort free and clear of the tenants’ leasehold
interests. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014
Bankr. LEXIS 913.
238
See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900-01.
239
See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at
898 (describing the majority approach).
240
See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898.
241
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
242
Id. See also Harding, supra note 142.
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Comment, has the potential to close the loophole in the bankruptcy process that
the individuals in Spanish Peaks were trying to exploit.243
C. SNDA Clauses: A Weakness to the Minority Approach and the Proposed
Solution
In addition to a request for adequate protection, judges might face the
obstacle of Subordination, Non-disturbance, and Attornment agreements
(commonly referred to as “SNDA agreement”).244 In entering into a leasehold
interest, tenants can protect themselves upfront by obtaining an SNDA
agreement, which they would ideally negotiate concurrently with the lease.245
An SNDA is a contract between a tenant and the mortgage lender of the tenant’s
landlord that specifies in advance what will happen with the tenant’s leasehold
interest in the event of a foreclosure.246 Parties to leases draft SNDA clauses to
protect tenants’ interests should the landlord liquidate its encumbered property
at bankruptcy auction.247 According to Andrew Royce:
The typical SNDA states that the lease is subordinate (or junior) to the
mortgage, but that if the mortgage is foreclosed, the new owner will
not disturb the tenant’s possession under its lease so long as the tenant
is not in default of the lease’s provisions, and the tenant will attorn to
and recognize the new owner as its landlord. Thus[,] the lease will
remain in effect, with the new owner becoming the landlord.248

Importantly, the typical SNDA clause addresses the event of “foreclosure,” not
bankruptcy.249 If Dolan had used such clauses in Spanish Peaks, they might have
created an insurmountable obstacle for the judges to overcome in dispossessing
the undeserving tenants. This concern might be much ado about nothing, though,
given that tenants would presumably have to bargain for SNDA agreements with
the landlord’s mortgage holder,250 which would in itself deter exploitation of the
Bankruptcy Code.

243

In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC 872 F.3d 892.
See Practical Legal Update, supra note 158 (providing that an SNDA will allow a tenant’s leasehold
interest to survive liquidation in a bankruptcy sale). See also Andrew Royce, SNDA Agreements Benefit Both
Tenants and Lenders, LAW360 (Mar. 6, 2017)(url omitted).
245
Practical Legal Update supra note 158 (providing that an SNDA will allow a tenant’s leasehold interest
to survive liquidation in a bankruptcy sale). See also Andrew Royce, supra note 244.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id. (emphasis added) (Andrew Royce is a partner in Sherin and Lodgen’s real estate department).
249
See id.
250
Id.
244
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Had Pinnacle Restaurant and Montana Opticom entered into a gardenvariety SNDA agreement with the mortgage lender of the Spanish Peaks Resort,
a judge likely could have found the clause inapplicable.251 Indeed, SNDA
clauses generally specify a tenant’s rights in the event of foreclosure.252 Ordinary
SNDA clauses therefore do not speak to a tenant’s rights in the event of
bankruptcy liquidation.253 Given that a foreclosure and a bankruptcy liquidation
are distinguishable events, a judge could simply look to the plain language of
the SNDA clause and thereby refuse to apply it to the purchase of land at
bankruptcy auction. A finding that the SNDA clause does not apply to landlord
bankruptcies would leave the tenant with only the remedy provided for under
the holding of the Ninth Circuit; namely, that the tenant will have to request
adequate protection prior to the bankruptcy auction to receive any compensation
or continued possession.254
The real problem with SNDA agreements will arise when tenants begin
stipulating in advance with the landlord’s mortgagee what will happen in the
event of a bankruptcy liquidation of the encumbered property.255 Had the
restaurant and telecommunications company in Spanish Peaks entered into such
an agreement with Spanish Peaks Acquisition Partners, LLC, the mortgagee of
the landlord-resort at the time of creation of the leases,256 the bankruptcy judge
would have had tremendous difficulty depriving them of continued possession.
Indeed, after Pinnacle and Montana Opticom entered into lease agreements with
the Spanish Peaks Ski Resort, and after the resort’s bankruptcy filing, SPAP
assigned its interest to CH SP Acquisitions, LLC, which was the mortgagee at
the time of the bankruptcy auction.257 CH SP then purchased the land at
auction.258 Therefore, had there been an SNDA contract that applied in the event
of bankruptcy liquidation, it arguably would have been binding on CH SP as the
ultimate assignee of all rights of SPAP.259 CH SP also would have lost the policy
argument that the Bankruptcy Code seeks to maximize creditor recovery,260
since it had essentially agreed to the clause (and thus consented to the risk of a
251

In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
Royce, supra note 244.
253
Id.
254
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
255
See Practical Legal Update, supra note 158.
256
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 894. The original mortgagee was Citigroup Global
Markets Realty Corp., which assigned the note and mortgage to Spanish Peaks Acquisition Partners, LLC, prior
to the creation of the leases. Id.
257
Id. at 894-95.
258
Id. at 895.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 900-01.
252
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reduced price at auction).261 Hence, a judge would probably have to apply the
SNDA, since the clause would specifically speak to landlord bankruptcies and
bind the landlord-debtor’s mortgage holder.
Although the application of an SNDA agreement to allow tenants to remain
in possession after bankruptcy liquidation of the encumbered land might at first
seem unjust in facts like those of Spanish Peaks,262 a closer look shows that
application of such clauses might not be so troublesome. In exchange for a right
to remain in possession in the event of a landlord bankruptcy, the tenants would
have to give the landlord’s mortgagee additional consideration. Depending on
how much the tenants would have to pay for an SNDA clause that applies to
bankruptcies, the need to give consideration would in itself discourage
individuals from seeking to exploit the loophole in the bankruptcy system via
contractual agreements. Further, a subsequent mortgage holder such as CH SP
would presumably acquire the mortgage at a reduced value due to the broader
SNDA clause. At the very least, CH SP would be on notice that the restaurant
and telecommunications company had a contractual right to continued
possession in the event of a landlord bankruptcy. In this light, SNDA agreements
that protect tenants from the risk of dispossession in landlord bankruptcies no
longer seem so problematic.
In fact, SNDA clauses offer tenant entities one way to protect themselves
from harsh results under the minority approach.263 Use of SNDA agreements
would dispel many of the complaints critics had about the negative real-world
effects of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Qualitech.264 Indeed, had the tenant
entity there negotiated an SNDA clause with the landlord’s mortgage lender
upon entering into the lease, the landlord would not have been able to liquidate
the encumbered property free and clear of the tenant’s interest.265 Further,
tenants with SNDA-agreement protections would presumably not hesitate to
make improvements to leased property for fear of dispossession upon landlord
bankruptcy.266 Most importantly, if tenants negotiate SNDA clauses, judges will
not have to worry about the minority approach yielding less tenant protection—

261

Id. at 894-95.
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
263
See Practical Legal Update, supra note 158.
264
See, e.g., In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1; Ferretti, supra note 70, at 723–28; Baxter, supra note 70;
Zinman, supra note 17, at 106-18; White & Medford, supra note 70, at 28; Genovese, supra note 70.
265
See Practical Legal Update, supra note 158; Royce, supra note 244.
266
See Zinman, supra note 17, at 99–100, for a discussion of the potential of the Seventh Circuit’s holding
to disrupt leasehold investment.
262
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the main criticism of the Seventh Circuit’s holding.267 At the same time, judges
could probably prevent SNDA clauses from enabling real estate developers such
as Dolan to exploit the bankruptcy system. Indeed, should a judge ever think it
necessary to invalidate an SNDA clause in a case involving a landlord
bankruptcy, there might be a creative way to do so. Such a solution, however,
can remain a topic for another paper.
D. Protecting Small Business under the Minority Approach
Businesses that do not seek assistance of legal counsel will be the most
vulnerable to undesirable results under the minority approach due to the
incentives for bankrupt landlords to not inform their tenants of the need to seek
protection. These entities are less likely to negotiate an SNDA clause and less
likely to request adequate protection prior to the bankruptcy auction; they will
consequently lose any right to compensation or continued possession.268
Represented lessors will avoid voluntarily informing lessees of the benefits of
an SNDA agreement and of the need to request adequate protection prior to a
bankruptcy sale. Indeed, if the lessor is seeking to reorganize under chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code, it will seek to maximize proceeds from liquidation of
the land. Except in cases like Spanish Peaks, where the same person controlled
the landlord entity and the tenant entities, the landlord will hope to strip off any
leases, since any encumbrances will reduce the sale price of land at auction.269
By choosing to not tell its tenants that they need to obtain an SNDA agreement
or request adequate protection to avoid losing their leasehold interests, the
landlord will have a greater chance of being able to sell the property free and
clear of any leases. The landlord will then have more money to allocate to its
creditors, which will increase its chances of getting an approved plan. Further,
in cases where the landlord intends to reacquire the property following the
bankruptcy sale, stripping off encumbrances will allow the landlord to both evict
the tenant and keep any of the tenant’s improvements. Thus, as the law currently
stands, leaving it to the landlord-debtor to give the tenant notice of the need to
request adequate protection would be akin to letting the fox guard the henhouse.
The lesson to be learned here is simple: to ensure that their rights will be

267
See In re Haskell, L.P., 321 B.R. 1; Ferretti, supra note 70, at 723–28; Baxter, supra note 70; Zinman,
supra note 17, at 106–18.
268
See In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 540. See also Practical
Legal Update, supra note 158 (providing that an SNDA will allow a tenant’s leasehold interest to survive
liquidation in a bankruptcy sale). See also Royce, supra note 244.
269
See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900.
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protected should landlord bankruptcy occur, small businesses just need to seek
counsel before entering into leasehold agreements.270
CONCLUSION
Spanish Peaks exposes a major loophole in the Bankruptcy Code in cases
involving landlord bankruptcies;271 this Comment has shown how judges might
close it to honor the Bankruptcy Code’s core policies of tenant protection and
maximization of creditor recovery.272 To exploit the loophole, a real estate
developer can create two entities and have them enter into a lease as landlord
and tenant. In the event the landlord entity must file for bankruptcy relief and
liquidate its encumbered land, the developer can sit on the tenant entity’s lease
to either remain in possession or receive compensation.273 If the tenant entity
gets to retain possession, the sale price of the land at auction will presumably be
lowered;274 at the same time, the developer will get a financial windfall from
either a buyout by the subsequent landlord or profits from the tenant entity’s
business.275 If, instead of continued possession, the tenant entity receives
compensation for its lost leasehold interest, that money will have to come out of
the landlord-debtor’s estate, reducing the pool of funds available for the
repayment of the debtor’s other creditors. Either possibility overprotects the
tenants and detracts from creditor recovery, thereby failing to properly balance
the Bankruptcy Code’s two competing goals.276

270
See Torrell, supra note 18, at 14 (“For tenants of a bankrupt landlord, the lesson to be learned here is
to aggressively pursue and protect one’s rights and request ‘adequate protection’ under Bankruptcy Code Section
363 when any sale of the underlying real property is proposed free and clear of the tenant’s lease.”); Harding,
supra note 142 (“From the viewpoint of a tenant, the clear message is that it should object early and often, and
in particular, should push for adequate protection (getting creative if necessary).”). Ideally, the small business’s
counsel will not only negotiate an SNDA agreement with the landlord’s mortgage holder, Practical Legal Update,
supra note 158, Royce, supra note 244, but will also alert the business of the need to immediately seek counsel
again in the event of a landlord bankruptcy.
271
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 899-900.
272
See id. at 900-01 (defining the maximization of creditor recovery and the protection of tenants as the
“core purpose[s]” of the Bankruptcy Code).
273
See In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548 (stating that adequate
protection will take the form of either continued possession or compensation); In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1996) (granting continued possession to the tenant of a bankrupt landlord). See also In re Spanish Peaks
Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach” and
Qualitech as an example of the “‘Minority’ approach”).
274
See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 900.
275
See Harding, supra note 142.
276
See In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892 (defining the maximization of creditor
recovery and the protection of tenants as the “core purpose[s]” of the Bankruptcy Code).
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Now that the Ninth Circuit has analyzed the facts of Spanish Peaks,277 other
real estate developers who were previously unaware of the Bankruptcy Code’s
loophole might start using the above business model as a blueprint for their own
developments.278 This will be especially true of developers in majority
jurisdictions, since tenant entities always receive continued possession in
landlord bankruptcies under the majority approach.279 Even in minority
jurisdictions, though, developers will request adequate protection in an effort to
manipulate judges into having to grant the tenant entities continued possession
or compensation.280 Most developers will probably arrange their businesses with
a landlord entity and various tenant entities as a safety net in case the landlord
entity fails and has to file for bankruptcy relief.281 Furthermore, bad actors could
file for bankruptcy relief from the start and use the tenant entities as a way to
make additional money at the expense of the landlord’s legitimate creditors.282
The majority approach of always granting continued possession offers courts
little flexibility in protecting creditors against such schemes.283
As this Comment has shown, however, the minority approach provides
judges with a way to deter developers from attempting to exploit the loophole in
the Bankruptcy Code. By placing a low value on a tenant entity’s leasehold

277
In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892; In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr.
LEXIS 913.
278
One could easily imagine other real estate developments that could be arranged like the Spanish Peaks
Resort, with a landlord entity owning the resort property and a number of smaller tenant entities providing the
amenities. For instance, a developer might set up a golf resort to have a landlord entity that owns the golf course
and the surrounding property and various tenant entities that run businesses such as a hotel, a pro shop, and a
nineteenth-hole bar.
279
See, e.g., In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996). See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II,
LLC, 872 F.3d at 898 (listing In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”).
280
See In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp., 327 F.3d at 548 (“‘Adequate
protection’ does not necessarily guarantee a lessee’s continued possession of the property, but it does demand,
in the alternative, that the lessee be compensated for the value of its leasehold—typically from the proceeds of
the sale.”); Torrell, supra note 18, at 14 (“For tenants of a bankrupt landlord, the lesson to be learned here is to
aggressively pursue and protect one’s rights and request ‘adequate protection’ under Bankruptcy Code Section
363 when any sale of the underlying real property is proposed free and clear of the tenant’s lease.”); Harding,
supra note 142 (“From the viewpoint of a tenant, the clear message is that it should object early and often, and
in particular, should push for adequate protection (getting creative if necessary).”).
281
This actually seemed to be the case in Spanish Peaks. Dolan ran a legitimate ski resort on the land at
issue for approximately five years. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at 894; In re Spanish Peaks
Holdings II LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 913, at *4-13. Only after the resort filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy and sold
its property at auction did Dolan try to recover losses with the restaurant lease and the telecom lease. See In re
Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892.
282
See generally Anderson, supra note 193; Drake, supra note 199; Drake, supra note 194; Fisher, supra
note 197.
283
See, e.g., In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 142. See also In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d at
898 (listing In re Taylor as an example of the “‘Majority’ Approach”).
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interest, the judge can minimize the amount of compensation the tenant receives
in the bankruptcy distribution process. No longer will it be worth the time, effort,
and expense for developers to set up a business so as to recoup losses in the
event of bankruptcy. At the same time, in cases where the tenants of bankrupt
landlords really do deserve protection, this Comment’s suggestions still allow
judges to grant continued possession or to place a fair value on the tenant’s
leasehold interest. In other words, the solution proposed in this Comment
enables a judge to use his/her discretion on a case-by-case basis to strike the
right balance between the Bankruptcy Code’s competing policies of protecting
tenants and maximizing creditor recovery.284 Only in a minority jurisdiction will
a judge be able to make this determination.285 The Ninth Circuit got it right.
Other courts should follow its lead.
BRADFORD N. BARNHARDT*
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See id. at 900-01 (defining protecting tenants and maximizing creditor recovery as the competing “core
purpose[s]” of the Bankruptcy Code).
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